In this project, we study the design of an innovative, dynamic contracting procedure to be used in tendering maintenance of road segments. Based upon work in performance contracting we intend to research a monetary incentive payment structure that stimulates contractors to (1) achieve the desired quality of work, (2) consider the impact on society, the social cost, and (3) collaborate with other contractors to produce joint work plans.

Our research focuses on both the theoretical concerns as well as the practical application of dynamic contracting. The former entails a detailed study of the underlying computational problem with a focus on algorithmic approaches to tackle the multi-agent, multi-objective and self-interested aspects thereof. Through a serious game that models the domain of highway maintenance with its complex decisions and interactions, we evaluate the use of dynamic contracting in a near real-world setup, while practitioners can experiment and learn to understand the DC concepts.


2010 - 2014

Funded by

Next Generation Infrastructures

More information

Please contact Mathijs de Weerdt


Dynamic Contracting at Almende