Philosophy of mind and embodied cognition

Stefan Buijsman has worked on concept learning and mental representations in a mathematical context. One of his ongoing research projects in the context of explainability is on concept-based explanations of algorithms.

Buijsman, S. (2021). Acquiring mathematical concepts: the viability of hypothesis testing. Mind and Language 36 (1): 48-61.

Buijsman, S. (2021). The representations of the approximate number system. Philosophical Psychology 34 (2): 300-317.

Janna van Grunsven is particularly interested in how different theoretical accounts of the mind and of the body, such as the 4E approach to cognition, inform the design of our technologies and shape our sociotechnical and scientific imagination, which, in turn, can have decisive ethical implications for how people in general – and persons with disabilities in particular – are brought in view in a moral sense. In 2022, Janna received a NWO Veni grant for the project “Mattering Minds: Understanding the Ethical Lives of Technologically Embedded Beings with 4E" to examine to how technology shapes our experience of the expressive bodily lives of others as beings who matter.

Veni Grant for the project Mattering Minds: Understanding the Ethical Lives of Technologically Embedded Beings with 4E

Van Grunsven, J & S. Roeser (2021) AAC Technology, Autism, and the Empathic Turn, Social Epistemology, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2021.1897189

Van Grunsven, J. (2020) “Perceptual Breakdown during a Global Pandemic: Introducing Phenomenological Insights for Digital Mental Health Purposes,” Ethics and Information Technology, published online Sept. 1st 2020,

Van Grunsven, J,  “Perceiving ‘Other’ Minds: Autism, 4E Cognition, and the Idea of Neurodiversity,” The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2020, 27(7-8), 115-143

Van Grunsven, J. & A. Van Wynsberghe “A Semblance of Aliveness: How the Expressive Bodies of Sex Robots Will Matter,” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 2019 Vol 23(3), pp. 290-317.

Van Grunsven, J,  “Enactivism, Second-Person Engagement, and Personal Responsibility,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2018. Vol 17 (1), pp. 131-156