Cyber Security Webinar by Dr. Gulshan Kumar – Secure Asynchronous Remote Attestation for Internet of Things

31 mei 2022 12:00 t/m 12:45 - Locatie: Zoom meeting | Zet in mijn agenda

Zoom Link

Meeting ID: 979 4661 7688

Passcode: 729172


Remote Attestation (RA) has emerged as a key technique of detecting the misbehavior of compromised devices. It enables a trustworthy entity, known as a verifier, to safely verify the internal states (i.e. RAM, flash, etc.) of a remote untrusted device, known as a prover.

Therefore, RA offers the verifier a static or dynamic root of trust in the prover. Remote attestation techniques traditionally focus on attesting the integrity of a single node and providing proof for its current state to a remote verifier. There are methods that attempt to tackle the issue of attesting more than one node. To guarantee the integrity of a software running on a single device, remote attestation is usually executed as an uninterrupted procedure: at the attestation time, a device stops the normal operation and executes the attestation of the entire device without interruption.

The remote attestation protocols that aim to attest many devices also follow the assumption on uninterrupted execution: when a device attests its network neighbors, each device verified in the neighborhood suspends its normal operation until the attestation protocol is completed. The talk will discuss the integration of Remote Attestation Solution in COLLABS Project.

Short bio:

Gulshan Kumar is working as a Post-Doctoral Researcher at SPRITZ Research Group, Department of Mathematics, University of Padua. He has over 10 years of academic and research experience. His research interest includes Blockchain Technology, Cyber Physical Systems, and Internet of Things. He is currently involved in technical and administrative responsibilities of project COLLABS - A COmprehensive cyber-intelligence framework for resilient coLLABorative manufacturing Systems. He has many publications in well renowned international journals and Conferences.

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